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P R I N T E D  I N  G R EA T B R I T A I N
The conquest o f the earth, which mostly means the 
taking it away from those who have a different com­
plexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is not 
a pretty thing when you look into it too much. 
What redeems it is the idea only. An idea at the 
back ofit; not a sentimental pretence butanidea; and 
an unselfish belief in the idea—something you can 
set up, and bow down before, and offer a sacrifice 
to . . .
J oseph  co nra d , H eart o f  Darkness
T H E P O L IT IC A L  ID EA S OF 
E N G L IS H  IM PER IA LISM
I h a v e  never had the good fortune to be a student o f anthropology, but I understand it is the practice in almost every type o f society, before instalhng 
a person into office, to impose on him some sort o f en­
durance test in the form o f an initiation ceremony. It 
was therefore with a strong bond o f sympathy that I read 
in my paper this morning o f the ordeal through which the 
new chief o f the Rozwi tribe has passed before being 
recognized. I must confess, however, that there have been 
times when, rather than face you all here tonight, I would 
have preferred to have undergone a similar ordeal to that 
o f Chief Samuriwo—to have sat naked in a cave all night 
with the bones o f my predecessors (alas! there are none) in 
a lion-infested area.
I am fully conscious o f the disadvantages under which 
this lecture is being given when compared with the recent 
performances o f my colleagues. As true men o f science 
they availed themselves o f batteries o f projectors throwing 
coloured pictures on the walls for your dehght and in­
struction. I come with none o f these supports. Perhaps I 
have been a little wanting in imagination over this. Per­
haps, Principal, it would have been fitting in view of my 
subject if our entrance had been effected with a trifle more 
grandeur, if instead o f that modest academic shuffle with 
which we advanced to this platform we had carried ourselves 
with more o f a proconsular gait, in the Curzon manner, 
as though we had just dismounted from our elephant out­
side. And then perhaps Sir, as you left me alone here to 
face this rather intimidating audience, the whole o f the
6 TH E PO L IT IC A L ID EAS OF
wall behind me might have been lit up with a panoramic 
three-dimensional film o f the Sudan in 1885, showing 
Gordon beleaguered in Khartoum with the camera finally 
coming to rest on a page o f his journal at that apposite 
entry: ‘What holes do I not put my self into! And for what? 
So mixed are my ideas. I beheve ambition put me here in 
this ruin.’
But, to strike a more serious note, there are difficulties 
beyond those o f mere presentation. I am conscious that 
in trying to trace the interconnexions between political 
thought and political action I am venturing on dubious 
ground. For the prevailing view among contemporary 
philosophers and historians would suggest that political 
thought is merely an ordered statement o f emotional 
beliefs and as such is a superficial and perhaps unimportant 
reflection o f the deeper-seated forces which direct human 
action. ‘It is impossible’, declares Sir Lewis Namier, ‘to 
attach to conscious political thought the importance which 
was ascribed to it a hundred, or even fifty, years ago. . . . 
What matters most’, he says, ‘is the underlying emotions, 
the music to which ideas are a mere libretto, often of a 
very inferior quality . . .’ [i]. Theorizing on politics is for 
Sir Lewis an artificial and rather unnatural activity, to be 
explained by the curious psychological need o f the human 
animal for self-justification and even self-deception. In a 
healthy state o f society such theorizing is harmless enough 
because it has no practical effect, but in a society under 
strain where the ordinary practical and empirical approach 
seems to be faffing it may have more dangerous conse­
quences. For it breeds the illusion that success in politics is 
to be achieved by the application o f abstract intellectual 
doctrines. The danger resides in giving to political doctrines 
the apparent sanction o f reason and science when in truth
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they conceal emotion in its most inflexible and tyrannical 
form. The disastrous results o f political ideologies make 
up the history o f our century. Sir Lewis Namier believes, 
then, that we are well rid o f political thought, and that 
the ordinary English pragmatic approach, which uses the 
intelligence to deal with the immediate problem in hand, 
rather than to spin and apply artificial theories, has stood 
the test o f time better than any other political method.
This reaction against political thought is understandable. 
The tough-minded, positivist post-war age in which we 
live seeks above all to be rid o f illusion and myth. Hence 
no doubt the vogue o f the Namier school with its attempt 
to penetrate behind the poses and formal gestures o f public 
men and to discover the motives and assumptions by which 
they acted in their ordinary unguarded moments. It is not 
for me to enter into the controversy which has sprung 
up from Professor Butterfield’s criticism that the Namier 
approach tends to take the mind out o f history; except 
perhaps to remark that the technique which may be ap­
propriate to the peculiar conditions o f eighteenth-century 
England is unlikely to have the same validity for the later 
nineteenth century when the classes open to intellectual in­
fluences had a much closer hold on political power. I would 
assert, however, that whatever be the true relationship be­
tween ideas and events, to ignore the former entirely is to 
remove a whole dimension from the study o f history. And, 
indeed, there can be no escaping ideas, or taking the mind 
out o f history, for even if we attempt to ignore the action 
o f ideas entirely we are ultimately left with a theory or hypo­
thesis o f how human nature works, that is we are left with 
a political theory such as the one Sir Lewis Namier holds.
At the same time one may acknowledge that English 
political thought since 1870 has been excessively academic,
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abstract, and often pretentious. From the death o f J. S. 
Mill in 1873 the professors took possession o f political 
thought and removed it from the turbulence o f  the poli­
tical arena to the quiet o f the college cloister. T. H. Green, 
F. H. Bradley, Bosanquet, Caird, Ritchie, Sidgwick, L. T. 
Hobhouse, the names that stud the textbooks o f  political 
thought, all belonged to academic men, and moreover, 
to academic men who were primarily philosophers. The 
result was no doubt, as Sir Lewis Namier suggests, an 
exaggerated notion o f the influence o f conscious political 
thought, in the making o f history, so that a historian like 
Lord Acton could exclaim, with characteristic hyperbole, 
that it would be easy to point out ‘a paragraph in St. 
Augustine, or a sentence in Grotius that outweighs in 
influence the Acts o f fifty Parliaments’ [2]. Hence, too, the 
tendency to trace the line o f descent through the classic 
works o f genius rather than through the more representative 
i f  more workaday writings o f men who used their pens 
as swords in the political battle.
These faults do not, however, vitiate the study o f political 
ideas. They simply suggest that the level o f reflection on 
politics has been wrongly chosen, that for the purposes 
o f illuminating history it is more appropriate to consider 
what Professor Oakeshott has defined as political thought 
in contradistinction to political philosophy. For political 
philosophy treats o f politics in their abstract and universal 
context; it deals with ‘the relation between politics and 
eternity’. To apply a phrase o f Hobbes, political philosophy 
excludes history, ‘because such knowledge is but experience 
and not ratiocination’. Political thought, on the other hand, 
springs from, and has reference to, immediate political 
experience, so that it cannot be divorced from its historical 
setting.
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Impatience with political thought has partly arisen no 
doubt because o f the abstraction which has marked it since 
1870, and, more perhaps, because o f its apparent lack of 
relevance to the main political experience o f the time. 
Now if  any central thread can be picked out o f the tangled 
skein o f the political attitudes o f the later nineteenth 
century, imperialism would appear to be the most promi­
nent and representative. Dr. Trevelyan speaks o f it as ‘the 
dominant political creed’ o f the period after 1886 [3], Sir 
Ernest Barker recognized it as ‘a widespread political 
theory which it is true hardly found any representative 
voice’ [4]. By dissecting the mind o f imperialism I would 
like to suggest that there is a plane o f historical experience 
at which the workings o f ideas and mental attitudes may 
be usefully studied. Moreover it is a plane, I would like 
to think, that in some ways overcomes the impasse created 
by modern philosophical objections to political thought. 
If political thought cannot pretend to the status o f a science, 
if it can never get beyond the subjective value-judgement, 
there seems a case for considering it more closely in its 
historical context, and seeing how ideas stand up to the 
wear and tear o f time. Not that I am suggesting that success 
should be the ultimate test o f political values, but rather 
that there is an element in all political thinking which may 
properly be brought to the judgement o f history. I mean 
that element which is based on a forecast o f the action 
and strength o f given historical forces. While there is no 
objective test by which we can judge the validity o f a 
political ideal or attitude, we can properly comment on 
its historical appropriateness with the hindsight history 
affords. Such a study makes no pretence at producing 
exact scientific judgements, and historians have rarely 
surrendered to such vain hopes. But it does, I think,
render more accurate and precise our thinking on political 
values which would otherwise be left to be fashioned by 
raw prejudice working on rough and partial experience. 
Any such study is bound to serve principally as a critical 
instrument, more negative than formative in its conclu­
sions. But if it cannot give much indication o f the positive 
validity o f past political ideals and attitudes, it can at least 
isolate and identify the element o f illusion and unreality 
which inhered in them. And it would be false to ask more 
o f any intellectual pursuit; for since life appears to be 
prompted by hunches, intuitions, and hopes springing 
from immediate experience, the task o f reason can pro­
perly be no more than to discipline, restrain, and direct 
them.
Finally, I would suggest that a study o f the political 
ideas o f imperialism is not without relevance to Central 
Africa today. The gulf that divides informed opinion in 
England from the best type o f conservative European 
opinion here is to be measured in mental and moral terms. 
While it would be wrong to identify the metropolitan 
outlook o f imperialism with that o f a European settler 
community, there is enough common ground to suggest 
that this mental and moral gulf has been created by the 
different rates at which the imperialist outlook has receded 
in the two countries. For imperialism was above all an 
unformulated philosophy o f life and politics. At its heart 
was the belief that political power tended constantly to 
deposit itself in the hands o f  a natural aristocracy, that 
power so deposited was morally valid, that it was not 
to be tamely surrendered before the claims o f abstract 
democratic ideals, but was to be asserted and exercised 
with justice and mercy. Against this belief has beaten 
the inexorable tide o f events o f the twentieth century,
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demonstrating that such a behef cannot be permanently 
upheld without a degree o f  coercive power which Euro­
pean communities o f the Western world have found them­
selves unable morally or materially to sustain.
The assertion that imperialism was primarily an emo­
tional and moral attitude is not nowadays regarded as 
patently absurd. We appear to be past the stage when 
imperialism could be considered almost exclusively in 
economic terms. Even among the neo-Marxists, before 
Lenin’s authority silenced their views, it was held by 
Bauer and Hilferding that imperialism was not an inevit­
able stage o f capitalism but represented a conscious choice to 
exploit an extensive colonial market as against an inten­
sive home market [5]. Seeing how little capital investment 
followed the scramble for Africa, even the exponents o f 
the theory o f economic imperialism, particularly Hobson, 
were forced to conclude that it was only a special and 
parasitic element o f capitahsm that was interested in the 
exploitation o f fresh colonial markets. Recent studies have 
emphasized the relatively subordinate part played by 
economic interests in Britain’s acquisition o f African em­
pire from the 1880s [6]. It seems that it was more the 
handiwork o f the professional classes—the official, the 
explorer, the soldier, the missionary—than o f the Birming­
ham manufacturer or the City financier.
The most suggestive and to my mind the most satisfying 
explanation o f imperialism was made by Schumpeter. So 
far from regarding imperialism as the highest stage o f 
capitalism Schumpeter argued that it was a transient 
aberration. For capitalism was in his view essentially 
pacific and cosmopolitan by nature, its chief characteristic 
being the absorption o f the warlike emotions in modem 
business activity. (In the university world we have, o f
12 THE PO L IT IC A L IDEAS OF
course, a whole range o f committees to absorb these 
emotions.) Imperialism was to be explained by the sur­
vival o f certain elements from the pre-capitalist world, 
particularly the persistence o f the landed gentry and officer 
class, which had infected part o f the modern bourgeoisie 
with its outlook and had formed an affiance with certain 
special capitalist elements who were interested in colonial 
expansion [7]. Whatever may be the validity o f  Schum­
peter’s analysis in any scientific sense, it is useful for my 
purpose in suggesting that the imperialist mind wore a 
dual aspect, one side deriving from modem intellectual 
sources and the other from a non-intellectual conservatism 
that in part reflected the ethos o f aristocracy. The im­
perial idea in its complex working amid the tangle o f 
historical events has recently been traced with a fine 
acumen and insight by Professor Thornton, the Professor 
o f History at our sister College o f the West Indies [8]. In 
this lecture I merely propose to isolate what appear to me 
to be some o f its fundamental thought-patterns, and to 
venture on what I freely admit are very hypothetical and 
tentative conclusions.
Despite the abstraction o f their thought the Oxford 
Idealists would appear to supply the most obvious link 
between political ideas and empire. Baffiol College, the 
‘Academy’ o f the Idealists—of Green, Toynbee, Bradley, 
Bosanquet, Nettleship, Caird, Ritchie—was also the nursery 
o f many o f the leading statesmen and publicists o f im­
perialism—ofCurzon, Milner, Grey, Asquith, L. S. Amery, 
and St. Loe Strachey. The other Oxford colleges followed 
in Baffiol’s wake. The connexion which might seem to 
link Idealism with imperialism was their subscription in 
some form to the Hegelian theory o f the State. This theory
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starts from a rejection o f liberalism and o f its distrust of 
political power. Instead o f regarding the laws and insti­
tutions o f society as a regrettable if  necessary restraint 
on individual spontaneity (which for liberalism was the 
source o f all progress), the Idealist attitude regarded poli­
tical society as the instrument which raised men to freedom 
and a moral life. Instead o f making the individual con­
science the arbiter o f political and social values, progres­
sively bringing institutions into closer conformity with 
its abstract ideals, the Idealists taught generally that the 
institutions o f society were themselves the concrete em­
bodiment o f moral ideals against which the deliverances o f 
the individual conscience were visionary, wilful, and anar­
chic. In opposition to the notion that society should be 
placed under the rule o f the critical intelligence they 
believed that politics should not be reduced to the cold 
abstractions o f  the rational and economic man but should 
be directed by the highest and noblest feelings. Likewise, 
in contrast to the cosmopolitanism and disinterested con­
cern for humanity which men like J. S. Mill and Buckle 
proclaimed, they conceived morality to consist in the 
conscientious discharge o f a man’s duties in the narrow 
circle o f societies in which he lived—his family, his work, 
the local group, the nation. Any wider loyalty than this 
was unreal since these were the limits o f natural feeling; the 
disinterested love o f humanity could be nothing but an 
intellectual abstraction.
All these notions, which have a respectable pedigree 
running back to Burke, are to be found in the celebrated 
essay, ‘My Station and Its Duties’, which F. H. Bradley 
published in his Ethical Studies in 1876, and which Bosan- 
quet regarded as one o f the great landmarks in the growth 
o f the English Idealist movement. The argument is worth
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elaborating even at the cost o f some repetition. The con­
trast with the older liberalism is to be seen most pointedly 
in Bradley’s attempt to overcome the dualism of the 
older ethical tradition. This had drawn a constant con­
trast between the actual and the ideal, assigning one to the 
sphere o f blind instinct and force, and the other to the 
sphere o f intelligence and spirit. The contrast was heigh­
tened by the Protestant religious tradition which assumed 
the sinfulness o f the ordinary world o f instinct and whose 
scheme o f salvation was directed solely to rescuing the 
individual by a direct illumination o f the conscience. 
Bradley rejected this outlook. So far from the individual 
being a self-made creature directed by his conscience, he 
was in fact the product o f the society in which he lived. 
The laws, customs, and institutions o f  society not merely 
set bounds to human appetite—in the form o f property, 
marriage, and ordered political arrangements—but they 
also moralized man’s basic animal nature and were the 
source o f his ideals. These ideals did not fall down fully 
fledged from heaven to enlighten the individual conscience. 
Rather were they the product o f social evolution and were 
inseparably bound up with the particular stage o f develop­
ment reached. To dissever the ideal from the limitations o f 
its actual historical context, to impart to it the unlimited 
and universal character o f an abstract ideal, and then to set 
it over against the actual world in condemnation o f the 
latter, all this must breed illusion and disaster. Bradley’s 
final conclusion was that o f Burke and Hegel. So far from 
history being, as judged by the standard o f the abstract ideal, 
a catalogue o f violence and wrong, the historical process 
represented the working out o f the Divine purpose—in 
Burke’s words, it was the known march o f Providence on 
earth.
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Here one would suppose was the appropriate ethical 
philosophy for imperialism. The reverence for the product 
o f history, for the state and its institutions, for a concrete 
existing political society which satisfied the ordinary in­
stincts o f men for wealth and power and yet transfused 
these instincts into an instrument o f peace and beneficence, 
all this would seem to point to the juncture o f Idealism 
with imperialism. So, too, would Bradley’s wish to see the 
characteristic emotion o f religion diverted from its con­
cern with personal salvation and a future life, to inspire 
instead a man’s daily work and his duties as a citizen. In 
1937 an able German scholar, Klaus Dockhorn, asserted 
the close connexion between Idealism and imperialism to 
be an historical fact [9]. His evidence was, however, re­
markably thin, consisting mainly o f extensive quotations 
from the stock-in-trade o f those who wish to connect im­
perialism with a quasi-Fascist political theory: Professor 
J. A. Cramb’s Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britain. These 
lectures delivered by Professor Cramb at King’s College, 
London, at the height o f the imperialist fervour in 1900, 
are undoubtedly the most insane piece o f mystical ranting 
that can ever have been inflicted on an English student 
audience. The only thing to be done when confronted with 
such monstrosities is to follow Max Beerbohm’s example 
whenever his train passed the Crystal Palace: we must pull 
down the blind and avert our gaze. A movement is not to 
be judged by its lunatic fringe. Dockhorn was undoubtedly 
following up the much more guarded remarks o f L. T. 
Hobhouse. In his book, Democracy and Reaction, Hobhouse 
contended that the Idealist philosophy had exercised a 
reactionary influence that was not perhaps generally ap­
preciated. The Rhine had flowed into the Thames. He did 
not assert, however, that Idealism had directly promoted
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imperialism, but rather that it had weakened resistance to 
it, since the effect o f Idealism was ‘to soften the edges o f all 
contrasts between right and wrong, truth and falsity, to 
throw a gloss over stupidity, and prejudice, and caste, and 
tradition, to weaken the bases o f reason, and disincline men 
to the searching analysis o f their habitual ways o f think­
ing’ [io]. When the German bombs began to fall on 
London in 1915 he believed he witnessed ‘the visible and 
tangible outcome o f a false and wicked doctrine . . . the 
Hegelian theory o f the God-state’ : and he turned to rend 
the Idealist political philosophy in its classic exposition, 
Bosanquet’s Philosophical Theory of the State [1 x]. (I need 
hardly add that Professor Hobhouse was not at King’s 
College, London. He was speaking at the New Jerusalem 
a little way down the road—the London School o f 
Economics.)
The difficulty concerning this attempt to link the Idealists 
with imperialism is that for all their debt to Hegel they 
remained obstinately Liberal in their political leanings. 
T. H. Green was an exponent o f ‘three acres and a cow’ 
radicalism, the form in which Gladstonian liberalism 
finally ossified and died. Green is said to have had a deci­
sive influence on Arnold Toynbee, whom his friend 
Alfred Milner felt obliged to clear from the imputation o f 
socialism. Nettleship, Green’s biographer and successor at 
Balliol, maintained his loyalty to the Liberals despite the 
defection caused by the Irish Home Rule Bill in 1886. 
Bosanquet, who took the Hegelian theory to its highest 
point o f development, was also a Liberal with radical 
sympathies, while D. G. Ritchie held pronounced socialist 
views. Bosanquet and his friend Edward Caird, who suc­
ceeded Jo  wett as Master o f Balliol in 1893, were resolute 
opponents o f the Boer War. Such instances may be
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multiplied. On the other hand there is no doubt that many 
lesser figures used the arguments o f Idealism, in combina­
tion with a popularized notion o f Darwin’s theory o f 
natural selection, to uphold the claims o f imperialism [12]. 
Hobhouse undoubtedly had these in mind when he made 
his attack, and Bosanquet was later forced to acknowledge 
that what he called ‘the large and many-sided philosophy’ 
had degenerated into a creed o f violence and self-interest 
by ‘its passage into the hands o f ignorant and biased 
amateurs, soldiers, historians, politicians’ [13]. But at this 
level it is difficult to speak o f intellectual influence, in the 
sense o f men acting from intellectual conviction. It would 
seem to be rather the case o f popular opinion taking hold 
o f intellectual theories which looked useful for its im­
mediate purposes.
There seem few grounds for believing that the Idealists 
exercised pronounced influence on any o f the leading im­
perialist figures. Curzon, Grey, and Asquith certainly 
passed through their hands, but they were not men to be 
greatly moved by intellectual theories. Asquith was per­
haps nearest to the academic mind and dipped quite 
deeply into philosophy. But for all his admiration o f T. H. 
Green he was the first to acknowledge that he never 
‘worshipped at the Temple’s inner shrine’ [14]. One ought 
perhaps to mention Rosebery, who for long was the 
leader o f the Liberal Imperialists. While not a Balliol man 
and going up to Oxford before Green had made a name, 
his language on the Empire might appear to breathe the 
Idealist ethos:
How marvellous it all is! Built not by saints and angels, but 
the work of men’s hands; cemented with men’s honest blood 
and with a world of tears, welded by the best brains of the 
centuries past; not without the taint and reproach incidental to
all human work, but constructed on the whole with pure and 
splendid purpose. Human and yet not wholly human, for the 
most heedless and the most cynical must see the finger of the 
Divine [15].
Where Lord Rosebery acquired such thoughts is unknown. 
Philosophy was a closed book to him, though he had, o f 
course, distinct historical talent. His ruling passion was, 
however, far removed from the world of ideas. At Oxford 
the Dean o f Christ Church felt obliged to make him choose 
between his college and his race-horse, Ladas, which he 
had entered for the Derby. He chose Ladas and was sent 
down from the University. The blow was a bitter one 
for Ladas came absolutely last. Twenty-five years later 
the wound still rankled. By then he had risen to be prime 
minister, but he found the wine o f supreme power sour 
to the taste. He was lonely, depressed, and racked with 
chronic insomnia. At last, on 6 June 1894, the day dawned 
which was to cancel out the bitterness o f his youth. Out 
on the Downs since six, he drank a glass o f champagne 
before the start, and there in the sight o f the delirious 
multitude, with odds of 9-2, Ladas II cantered home to 
win the Derby. Lord Esher says: ‘He was genuinely 
moved. All he could say was “ At last!” . Such a reception 
never was seen at Epsom’ [16].
Haldane, more than any o f the other Liberal Imperialists, 
combined Idealist metaphysics with politics, but his 
example serves to demonstrate that if the one had any 
effect upon the other it was in the direction o f strengthen­
ing the sentimental conception o f empire. Now this con­
ception, which looked on the Empire as a group o f 
self-governing nations held together simply by the tie 
o f sentiment is to be sharply distinguished from what 
is properly understood as imperialism, which implies a
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readiness to use, i f  necessary, coercive force to maintain the 
integrity o f the Empire. The political theory o f  Idealism 
founded the moral basis o f political power in the general 
will, that is, the steady settled convictions and sentiments 
o f the people at large. Lionel Curtis and the Round Table 
group were steeped in the Oxford Idealist atmosphere, 
and Dockhom quotes heavily from The Round Table to 
prove the connexion between Idealism and imperialist 
feeling [17]. Yet although this group followed their master 
Milner in holding that the sentimental tie o f empire must 
be strengthened by the fashioning o f solid political bonds, 
it is noticeable that they rejected the notion o f coercion in 
a way that drew a clear line o f division between Milner 
and themselves. To Milner the Union o f South Africa Act 
appeared as the last in ‘a perfect series o f gigantic blunders’ 
and signified the refusal o f England to persist in the task o f 
exerting her power over a period sufficiently long to secure 
the British character o f South Africa in perpetuity. Curtis 
and his friends, on the other hand, looked on the Act o f 
Union as a consummate triumph; and Curtis himself went 
on later to advocate a large measure o f  self-government 
for India, since his conception o f the Commonwealth could 
not embrace a coerced or unwilling member.
Milner, then, for all his close association with Arnold 
Toynbee and the Balliol group, did not, it seems to me, 
draw his distinctive ideas from the Idealist school. Despite 
his German ancestry and upbringing, the hard, steely 
qualities o f his mind were far removed from the cloudy 
metaphysical notions o f empire which Curtis and even 
Amery (though an anti-Hegelian) sometimes betrayed in 
their language. Thesharp clarity and concreteness ofMilner’s 
conception is much nearer, to my mind, to that other 
school o f thought which preached scientific efficiency and
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the planned development o f society by an intellectual 
elite: Fabian socialism. It is not accidental that Milner 
should have had close associations with the early Fabian 
leaders, particularly the Webbs, and that he was prepared 
to go farther than any o f the other Liberal notables, 
including Haldane, in his willingness to use coercive 
political machinery to effect reforms. This preparedness to 
use coercion as a morally valid instrument is, as I see it, the dis­
tinguishing mark o f the imperialist outlook, but its intellec­
tual origin stems from quite a different source than Idealism.
The Webbs stood in the Utilitarian intellectual tradi­
tion. They held to the notion that it was possible to estab­
lish a practical science o f politics, but they, o f course, 
reversed the general Benthamite assumption that this would 
postulate a society in which government intervention was 
kept to a minimum. When it came to the point, however, 
they acknowledged that all measures o f coercion must 
have the broad support o f the popular will, and their 
democratic leanings grew with the years [18]. Milner was 
more o f a national socialist o f the Bismarckian kind, and 
his growing belief in autocracy moved him in an opposite 
direction to the Webbs. Beatrice Webb later came to 
believe he was a Prussian Junker at heart [19]. (But then 
her diary is notable for its tart comments even on close 
political acquaintances. One recalls her comments on the 
Liberal Imperialists—‘Asquith is deplorably slack; Grey is 
a mere dilettante; Haldane plays at political intrigue and 
has no democratic principles; Perks is an unclean beast. . . ’.) 
Milner’s support o f tariff protection, conscription, and a 
formal federation o f the Empire set him apart and helped 
to complete the political isolation that was so marked a 
feature o f his career after the Boer War. In carrying 
State action to this extent, Milner, like the Fabians in
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other directions, went beyond the general outlook o f the 
school which inherited the authoritarian strain in the old 
Benthamism and which supplied perhaps the strongest 
intellectual ingredient o f the imperialist outlook.
The contribution o f the authoritarian Liberals to im­
perialism has been described by Dr. Roach o f Cambridge, 
and I have myself traced the process elsewhere in con­
nexion with India [20]. In contrast with Idealism which 
did not begin to take serious hold until the late 1870s, 
authoritarian liberalism had deeper historical roots, and, 
o f more importance, possessed an intellectual content 
which had a much closer bearing on practical affairs. This 
type o f liberalism did not become fully articulate until 
1886 when the Home Rule crisis caused it to separate itself 
off from the Liberal Party, but as early as the 1860s Fitz- 
james Stephen had noted the incompatibility between 
what he called the liberalism o f the intellect and the 
liberalism o f sentiment. The defection o f 1886 occurred 
most noticeably among men brought up in the Cambridge 
intellectual tradition, in which cool dispassionate logic 
and a contempt for cloudy metaphysics were chiefly 
prized. They numbered Sir Henry Maine, Fitzjames 
Stephen, Sidgwick, Seeley and, although an Oxford man, 
A. V. Dicey, who by family connexion and intellectual 
bent belonged to the same Utilitarian and Evangelical 
strain. They also numbered in a loose sense the leading 
men o f the Spectator, R. H. Hutton, Meredith Townsend, 
St. Loe Strachey, and Edward Dicey, as well as com­
manding the support o f Cromer and Sir Alfred Lyall. 
Their principal concern was to defend the reign of in­
telligence against the destructive onslaught o f blind mass 
emotion. For them the Utilitarian teachings on logic, 
political economy, and jurisprudence laid down the iron
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laws o f social progress; and the democracy’s flouting o f  
these laws in the name o f sentimental ideals appeared to them 
to threaten the whole edifice o f civilized life. Gladstone’s 
decision in favour o f Irish Home Rule they regarded as a 
fearful portent, since it meant the abject surrender o f  
scientific government to the forces o f unreason. Their 
attitude was principally a defensive, defiant one. They 
passed through the age o f imperialism looking at the other 
great colonial problems in the light o f the Irish issue. 
Confronted by the claims o f Egyptian, Indian, and Afri­
kaner nationalism (though there was hesitancy and division 
over the last), they resisted the demand for the relinquish­
ment o f British control, believing that without the pax 
Britannica the essentials o f progress—the framework o f 
order, impartial law, freedom o f contract and trade— 
would quickly disappear. It was no accident that this 
school should have contained a strong contingent o f 
lawyers, for these supplied the authoritarian mentality. 
In all other respects the exponents o f a free society and a 
free economy, they saw the maintenance o f law and order 
as a first precondition and recognized that this precondition 
could not always be obtained without the ultimate backing 
o f military force. The age had taught its lesson. Germany 
had become united, and the United States saved from dis­
memberment, by military force. The establishment o f law 
and order in India (and later Egypt) by a handful o f soldiers 
and officials was showing itself to be the precursor o f a 
great internal revolution that would rapidly raise these 
countries from a backward, stagnant condition to the level 
o f modem states. Fitzjames Stephen had returned from his 
post as Law Member in India to expound the bearing o f 
these truths for political thought in his book Liberty, 
Equality, Fraternity, published in 1873. And cooler minds,
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like those o f Sir Alfred Lyall and Sir Evelyn Baring (Lord 
Cromer), recognized the part played by political power in 
the advance of civilization, although with greater historical 
sensitivity they recognized that military force as such was 
only one element in imperial rule [21]. The strong Liberal 
element in their thought needs to be stressed. Lyall wrote 
to Morley, the high priest o f mid-Victorian liberalism, 
in August 1892: ‘Although we hold different opinions on 
the question o f Irish Home Rule, I think we should find 
ourselves in virtual agreement on almost every other 
question.’ Cromer’s outlook, as he acknowledged, moved 
in close sympathy with Lyall’s [22]. They distrusted the 
mass emotional imperialism o f the late 1890s. As Lyall 
told Morley in 1900 he thought ‘that the English folk 
have been swept too far by that stream o f rash energetic 
activity which is commonly termed Imperialism. Yet the 
main difference is that whereas formerly we did our Im­
perialism quietly, so that people hardly knew what they 
were about, we now proclaim it upon the housetops’ [23]. 
Their standpoint, as I said, was largely a defensive one. 
They were concerned to prevent the dissolution o f British 
power before it had completed its civilizing mission. 
They were in no sense diehards, having a strong apprecia­
tion o f the nature o f historical forces, but they were 
against any premature abdication o f  authority.
Dr. Roach has termed their outlook old liberalism. The 
term is certainly appropriate in the sense that the majority 
o f its exponents were born before 1850 and were from 
1900 a dying force. Cromer said in 19x3 that the mid- 
Victorian Liberals were a school o f politicians whose ideas 
had now been swept into the limbo o f forgotten things [24]. 
Milner could not be said to belong to this school although 
he probably derived much from it. He had broken away
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from the premisses o f the old liberalism, with its faith in 
a spontaneously self-acting society when once the frame­
work o f law and order had been established. To him this 
was simply a policy o f drift which if  left uncountered by 
a vigorous movement o f conscious organization would 
result in the dissolution o f  the Empire into a number o f 
independent communities. He, too, claimed to be acting 
on the defensive; the task o f his generation o f imperialists 
was as he said, ‘to hold the fort during the long and in­
dispensable process o f education,—to try and prevent our 
Imperial heritage from being dissipated before its mean­
ing and value could be generally understood’ [25]. This 
task, however, required a positive effort, and meant a 
conscious use o f the political instrument to give definite 
shape and body to the ‘loose, uncompacted material’ which 
made up the Empire. One such beginning towards that 
single body politic o f which Milner dreamed was the 
modification o f England’s free trade structure by a system 
of imperial preference. Now this issue, when formally 
championed by Chamberlain in 1903 caused the defection 
o f  an important section o f the Liberal Unionists from 
Balfour’s Conservative ministry, and so effectively split 
the imperialist ranks. It is significant that imperialism lost 
its most important intellectual support from this time.
But, o f course, intellectual support is not everything, 
and what held imperialism together was something more 
deep-seated. A. V. Dicey, who opposed Home Rule and 
supported the Boer War on the supposedly logical grounds 
that Irish and Boer nationalism were irrational anachron­
isms in an age o f great states, was compelled to admit that 
the faith o f imperialism contained itself an irrational emo­
tional element. It was, he said, ‘a kind o f sentiment which 
it is extremely hard to express in terms o f utilitarian
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philosophy. Imperialism is to all who share it a form o f 
passionate feeling; it is a political religion, for it is public 
spirit touched with emotion’ [26]. Many other imperialists 
expressed the same notion. W. A. S. Hewins, the economist 
and tariff reformer (and—for his sins—first Director o f the 
London School o f Economics) confessed to Bertrand 
Russell that although brought up in the Roman Catholic 
Church he had since replaced faith in the Church by faith 
in the British Empire [27]. Curzon seems to have been 
moved by a similar faith; and even the reticent Milner 
spoke o f his need o f help from a Higher Power to sustain 
his work [28]. Now this transference of religious emotion 
to secular objects was an important feature which I shall 
discuss later in connexion with Kipling. But like so much 
o f English religion it was concerned with the moulding 
o f individual character. The service o f Empire appeared 
to provide the great safeguard against the possibility that 
in an increasingly overcrowded, urbanized society the 
Englishman’s character would soften and deteriorate. ‘As 
for the priceless asset o f national character’, argued Curzon, 
‘without a world to conquer or duty to perform, it would 
rot to atrophy and inanition’ [29]. Dicey over Irish Home 
Rule expressed similar fears o f the growing softness o f the 
Englishman, his desire to avoid trouble and difficulty, and 
consequently his willingness to make concessions which his 
forefathers would have refused even under the threat o f 
armed rebellion. Meredith Townsend o f the Spectator, a 
Liberal who had spent much o f his life in India and deserted 
Gladstone over Home Rule, spoke in a similar vein:
For whether for good or evil, a great change is passing over 
Englishmen. They have become uncertain of themselves, afraid 
of their old opinions, doubtful of the true teaching of their 
consciences. They doubt if they have any longer any moral
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right to rule anyone, themselves almost included. An old 
mental disease, the love of approbation, has suddenly risen 
among them to the height of a passion. Instead of being content 
to rule well, to do justice and to love mercy, they are trying 
themselves by a new standard, a desire to rule so that the 
governed may applaud, or as they phrase it with a certain 
unctuousness, may ‘love’ them. That is the real root of the great 
change which has passed over the management of children, of 
the whole difficulty in Ireland, of the reluctance to conquer, and 
of the whole of the new philanthropic social legislation [30].
Sir Alfred Lyall, normally the coolest o f men, wrote to 
Morley over England’s apparent inability to put down 
lawlessness in Ireland that he would like to see ‘a little 
more fierceness and honest brutality in the national 
temperament’. He voiced the fear that a great concentration 
o f wealth and luxury among certain classes would produce 
‘a general indifference, relaxation o f fibre, and a carelessness 
as to what went on in the outlying parts o f the empire’ 
[3 J ].
This preoccupation with character was, o f course, part 
o f a wider concern to sustain a particular code o f values 
and attitude to life. And here I think we touch upon what 
Schumpeter saw as the mystique o f pre-capitalist society 
being projected into the modern world; certain sections 
o f the middle class—particularly those connected with the 
Services and colonial administration—trying to perpetuate 
the ethos and outlook o f aristocracy. By nature inarticulate 
and anti-intellectual it was never explicitly formulated. 
Psychologically it stood for an ordered hierarchical society 
in which relations between classes would depend on status 
rather than contract and be infused with a feudal sentiment 
o f mutual obligation and respect. It looked for its example 
to the ancient community o f the soil. At the same time the
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new would-be aristocracy was self-made, so that its title- 
deeds were not prescription but natural ability.
Rudyard Kipling was, I think, its most representative 
voice. He combined the feeling for a stable, hierar­
chical social order with a Puritan ethic o f individual self­
development. His most impressionable experience had 
been India. There he believed he had looked on life in its 
essential immediacy and seen human and physical nature 
stripped o f its disguises. In India the remorseless and 
pitiless struggle o f human existence was watched over 
anxiously by a tiny undermanned corps o f British officials 
and soldiers who at the price o f exile, sickness, overwork, 
and scant recognition, strove to avert the threat o f famine, 
disease, and anarchy [32]. The strenuous nature o f the 
work tested each man to the full stretch o f his powers, 
and humbled him by the knowledge o f his own personal 
unimportance and insignificance before the magnitude 
o f the work itself. It necessitated submission to authority, 
discipline, and the bridling o f self-will. There was no 
occasion or inducement for a man to think up visionary 
schemes framed in the light of abstract ideals; all he 
could do was to pour his entire vision and energy into 
the immediate task in hand. In this way Kipling conceived 
o f work as the means not only o f self-fulfilment but of 
salvation. For it gave to human vision and aspiration their 
only tangible form o f realization, while at the same time 
it saved man from himself, from conceit, illusion, self- 
pity, and nameless psychological fear. By forgetting him­
self in his work a man became a vessel for the workings of 
the power and vision that came from on high:
Good work has nothing to do with—doesn’t belong to—the 
person who does it. It’s put into him or her from outside. . . . 
A great deal depends on being master of the bricks and mortar
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of the trade. But the instant we begin to think of success and 
the effect of our work—to play with our eye on the gallery— 
we lose power and touch and everything else. . . . [Success] 
isn’t got at by sacrificing people— . . . ; you must sacrifice 
yourself, and live under orders, and never think for yourself, 
and never have real satisfaction in your work except just at the 
beginning when you’re reaching out after a notion. . . [33].
For Kipling the nature o f work, like all first-hand ex­
perience, was to be unreflecting and inarticulate. ‘ “Make 
that young Leviathan speak,” said Cleaver [a London 
writer, referring to a young subaltern back from the 
Burmese War], “How can he speak” , said I, “ He’s done 
the work. The two don’t go together”  ’ [34]. Kipling took 
Rhodes as another exemplar, o f a ‘dreamer devout by 
vision led beyond our guess or reach’ ; and o f the man him­
self as a mere vessel o f the vision, ‘This Power that wrought 
on us and goes Back to the Power again’. Rhodes’s great 
quality is seen as his inarticulateness:
The travail of his spirit bred 
Cities in place of speech.
So huge the all-mastering thought that drove—
So brief the term allowed—
Nations, not words, he linked to prove 
His faith before the crowd [35].
From Kipling’s conception o f the function o f work, or 
rather craftsmanship, followed the rest o f his distinctive 
ideas. It was o f supreme importance that the world’s work 
should be done well, and that society should be organized 
accordingly. This entailed specialization o f function and an 
hierarchical social order, the true equality o f  men residing 
in each attending to his appointed task. Kipling was no 
blind defender o f existing society. He was all too aware o f 
the danger o f an hereditary governing class becoming
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effete, and o f the observance o f convention becoming a 
substitute for constant individual thought and exertion. 
Rather was he the advocate o f an aristocracy o f natural 
ability, o f a dedicated leadership.
Here we again strike that distinctive feature o f the im­
perialist mind, the transference o f religious emotion to secular 
purposes. For Kipling saw his natural aristocracy in terms o f 
a priesthood that was inevitably unpopular, misunderstood, 
doomed to sacrifice itself and to suffer in silence. Hence 
the almost blasphemous claims for the pro-consuls, which 
he made in a poem under that title dedicated to Milner:
T h ese  at labour make no sign 
More than planets, tides or years
Which discover God’s design,
Not our hopes and not our fears;
Nor in aught they gain or lose 
Seek a triumph or excuse!
F o r , so the A r k  be borne to Z io n ,  w h o
H ee d s  h o w  th ey  p erish e d  or w ere  p a id  that bore it?
F o r , so the S h rin e  abide, w h a t sham e— w h a t p rid e —
I f  w e , the priests, w ere  bound or cro w n ed  before it?  [36]
This daring, almost perverse, use o f religious imagery 
runs through the whole o f his writings, and is designed to 
enforce the truth that the Divine (or whatever one chooses 
to call it) is not a d e u s  a b sco n d itu s  but is to be found active in 
the ordinary lives o f men. The nature o f a man’s religious 
creed was o f little consequence; indeed, doctrinal ideas might 
even get in the way if  they led men to miss the substance for the 
shadow, the fact for the word. The true religion lay in service,
Not as a ladder from earth to Heaven, not as a witness to 
any creed,
But simple service simply given to his own kind in their 
common need. [37]
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The true service could only be performed by indirect 
means, by the example o f  self-sacrifice and by attending 
to men’s bodily needs rather than trying to break through 
directly to their souls. So that the missionary, however 
courageous, was misguided compared with the district 
officer who kept the peace and looked to the crops [38]. 
Not an attempt to overleap the bounds o f ordinary life, 
but the raising o f  ordinary life to an heroic level; not a 
scorning o f  the body and the physical world, but its being 
turned to a sacramental use; these convictions lie at the 
heart o f  the imperialist faith. In some ways it is a reversion 
to the Catholic conception o f society—each order fulfill­
ing its function by employing its appropriate gifts rather 
than the individual trying to ignore the limitations o f his 
setting and aiming at some impossible perfection.
Such a view meant a conscious acceptance o f imperfec­
tion, o f the necessity o f working with tainted hands.
Lesser men feign greater goals,
Failing whereof they may sit 
Scholarly to judge the souls 
That go down into the Pit 
And, despite its certain clay,
Heave a new world toward the day.
Rosebery, it may be remembered, had spoken o f the 
Empire in a similar manner, and Chamberlain in his 
blunter fashion had declared that you could not have 
omelettes without breaking eggs. Moberly Bell, editor o f 
The Times, when defending Rhodes after the Jameson 
Raid, gave the argument a more philosophic and dan­
gerous twist:
The curse of the present age is an overbelief in culture, 
civilisation and altruism. They are all excellent qualities, we
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should cultivate them, we should choose our friends among 
those possessing them, we should educate our children up to 
them—but if the world consisted of them alone we should be in 
about as bad a way as if all horses were racehorses. We wear 
black cloth coats & top hats but we dont insist on employing 
only bricklayers who wear them. The rough & tumble every­
day work of the world has to be done by people with other 
qualities. . . . When you want a man to build you a house you 
dont enquire into his moral or ethical qualities. Why should 
you when you want to build an empire? Do you think that 
Drake or Clive or Warren Hastings or Nelson were all faultless 
gentlemen. We have to use the tools that are to hand. . . [39].
Kipling drew a constant contrast between the cloistered, 
untested virtue o f the stay-at-home critic and the practising 
if blemished virtue o f men who did the world’s work. The 
necessary co-presence o f evil with good is, o f course, a 
leading axiom o f conservative thought, and may be found 
enunciated in the works o f Burke, Hegel, and Bradley.
The whole o f Kipling’s outlook was oriented in conscious 
opposition to that o f modem urbanized society, and o f its 
distinctive creed, liberalism. The urban bourgeois was 
rootless, living in an atomized society bereft o f  order and 
natural leadership. Dwelling in an entirely artificial, man­
made environment, he was sundered from immediate con­
tact with the forces o f nature and sheltered from the 
essential realities o f life. Divorced from first-hand ex­
perience his knowledge was o f a similar kind; it was—to 
use a distinction o f Professor Price—‘thought knowledge’ 
in contrast to ‘observation knowledge’, not the inarticulate 
knowledge o f the ‘man on the spot’ or the craftsman, but 
that second-hand or second-order knowledge when ex­
perience is reduced to words. Professor Oakeshott who 
likes to use the analogy o f cooking would say that it is the
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contrast between the knowledge o f the chef and the 
knowledge of a recipe, between an instinctive code o f 
behaviour and the knowledge derived from a book o f 
etiquette. The mark o f the intellectual was book-learning 
and his one tool, the use o f words. The critical intelligence 
had been developed in him to a monstrous and unnatural 
degree, so that his instinctive life was ‘sicklied o ’er with 
the pale cast o f thought’. Not being in contact with im­
mediate reality, not having to put himself to the test and to 
match thought by deed, he framed to himself an abstract 
scheme o f values drawn out o f reflection on book know­
ledge. The mark o f this abstract scheme was its claim to 
establish a higher morality than the prevailing practice o f 
the world. In consequence it condemned the existing order 
o f things as the outcome o f tyrannous restraints placed on 
the mass o f the people whose nature it held to be funda­
mentally virtuous. While for Kipling power and force 
were part o f the essential discipline required by human 
nature, for the liberal they were inherently evil. Kipling 
saw the liberal as the victim o f the most dangerous form o f 
illusion, hypocrisy. Claiming to be directed by a higher 
morality he was kept blinded to his own egotism. His 
creed was essentially a critical one that demanded no real 
sacrifice o f himself. Kipling noted that liberals ‘for all their 
unrest at the agonies o f others. . . abandon no whit o f soft 
living’. It was the creed o f the comfortable and reflected 
their aversion to any form o f discipline or restraint. And 
yet its result was fearful, because it had all the character and 
force o f a religion'—a religion in which men made god in 
their own image and delivered themselves anew to their 
ancient enemies, vanity and sloth [40].
From this class came the opposition to empire, since 
empire did not square with its abstract democratic ideals
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and its abstract dislike o f dominion and power. (It was no 
more than an abstract dislike because in practice like all 
demagogic sentiments it was insatiably power-hungry but 
disguised this by aiming at power in a different form.) Its 
typical representative was the censorious itinerant M.P. 
whom Kipling satirized in Pagett M.P. and the tale Little 
Foxes. But it would be superficial to think that he was 
simply opposed to one particular political view. His objec­
tion went much deeper—it extended to the whole race of 
politicians and all those who lived by trading in words and 
slogans. Nothing can match his scorn for the M.P. who 
came down to Westward Ho and lectured about patriotism 
and waved a Union Jack in their faces. For Kipling these 
were holy matters to be kept behind the veil. In his ‘Song 
o f the English’ it is the dumb created things, the fruit o f 
work, that are made to speak for the cause o f empire—the 
lighthouses, the deep-sea cables, the cities. Above all, the 
ships:
Go, get you gone up-Channel with the sea-crust on your 
plates;
Go, get you into London with the burden of your freights!
Haste, for they talk of Empire there, and say, if any seek,
The Lights of England sent you and by silence shall ye speak!
The Empire then for Kipling represented not simply the 
appointed task bequeathed by history, it represented that 
type o f  life and work which would combat the deteriora­
tion o f character brought about by an excessively urbanized 
and intellectualized civilization. Through emigration the 
balance between town and country population might be 
restored in the Empire as a whole, and the dissocia­
tion between reason and instinct repaired. Milner, too, 
held the same notion [41]. It lay behind the campaign for
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compulsory military training and can be traced among 
the motives which led to the foundation o f Baden- 
Powell’s Boy Scout movement.
Kipling’s outlook, it seems to me, stands in a recognizably 
conservative tradition. It is true that he had not the same 
balance as Burke, nor the same generosity o f  mind or 
philosophic reach. But by the intuitive nature of his 
temperament he was nearer to the instincts o f his class, 
and expressed them undistorted by an intellectual medium. 
Edmund Wilson argued that his mind had the violence o f 
suppressed fear. Whatever its psychological origins it is 
difficult to call his outlook, as Lionel Trilling does, ‘a puny 
and mindless imperialism’. For it possessed all those ingre­
dients which Burke fashioned into a profound philosophy 
o f life and politics, and which must be met and answered 
before a man can properly call himself a liberal [42]. It is 
remarkable, I think, that the overt Hegelian movement o f 
Oxford Idealism should in practice have been deflected to 
the liberal cause, and that it was left to Kipling to harness 
its basic assumptions to the cause o f imperialism.
I said earlier in my lecture that the study o f political 
thought in its historical context had the advantage o f  
testing ideas against the wear and tear o f time. The 
twentieth century has brutally revealed the illusions that 
inhered in the imperialist mind—its illusion about its own 
efficiency, its caricature o f liberalism, its own full measure 
o f hypocrisy, its woeful underestimate o f the material and 
spiritual cost o f the use o f force, its failure to reckon with 
the strength o f historical trends. In this last respect 
Kipling and Milner failed to take into their reckoning 
how strongly the tide was setting, not merely in England 
but in the dominions overseas, towards an urbanized, 
bureaucratic, levelling society. It was here that their view
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was most deficient because it eluded the problem o f the 
age—to find a philosophy o f life and politics appropriate 
to urban man. Imperialists like Cromer and Lyall did not 
share this deficient historical sense, and were more aware 
that the action o f historical forces—the progressive redis­
tribution o f economic and intellectual power throughout 
the world—required a policy o f constant political adjust­
ment. Kipling and Milner were left to fight a ‘last-ditch’ 
battle and to become allies o f die-hard conservatism, o f the 
‘obese, unchallenged old things that stifle and overlie us’ 
which both had fought so strongly in their earlier career.
Yet if  the verdict o f the twentieth century has gone 
against imperialism, a philosophy o f politics, as I have 
remarked, does not finally stand or fall by its failure or 
success in action. Inasmuch as imperialism stood in the fine 
o f descent o f a permanent political tradition, the permanent 
elements remain, although they will receive another mode 
of expression.
On an occasion like this a man is expected to say some­
thing o f the star by which he sets his course. I hope, what­
ever my obscurities, that at least shines through; for it is 
my personal belief that to inquire into the nature, and to 
observe the fate, o f ideas and attitudes on which men stake 
their lives is to experience the highest illumination which 
the study of history is capable of yielding.
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